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Abstract—Bitcoin has introduced a new concept that could 
feasibly revolutionise the entire Internet as it exists, and positively 
impact on many types of industries including, but not limited to, 
banking, public sector and supply chain. This innovation is 
grounded on pseudo-anonymity and strives on its innovative 
decentralised architecture based on the blockchain technology. 
Blockchain is pushing forward a race of transaction-based 
applications with trust establishment without the need for a 
centralised authority, promoting accountability and transparency 
within the business process. However, a blockchain ledger (e.g., 
Bitcoin) tend to become very complex and specialised tools, 
collectively called “Blockchain Analytics”, are required to allow 
individuals, law enforcement agencies and service providers to 
search, explore and visualise it. Over the last years, several 
analytical tools have been developed with capabilities that allow, 
e.g., to map relationships, examine flow of transactions and filter 
crime instances as a way to enhance forensic investigations. This 
paper discusses the current state of blockchain analytical tools and 
presents a thematic taxonomy model based on their applications. 
It also examines open challenges for future development and 
research. 
Keywords— blockchain; cryptocurrency; bitcoin; tools; 
blockchain analytics; digital forensics; cybercrime investigation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Blockchain analysis is an entirely new field of research and 
development, which started to emerge in 2014 as a trend within 
the cryptocurrency ecosystem. This trend was mainly pushed by 
its transparent and decentralised nature.  
Blockchain Analytics provide a useful tool for individuals to 
inspect the network of transactions in terms of, e.g., flaw 
analysis and transaction relationships [1]. Also, as 
cryptocurrencies thrive and grow as mainstream payment 
method, insights into how people are spending them become 
increasingly relevant. Not just in terms of which products or 
services are bought with them, but also knowledge of how long 
people are keeping cryptocurrency in their wallets, in a way to 
stimulate the worldwide adoption of cryptocurrency [2][3]. For 
law enforcement, identifying these type of activities is important 
in order to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing. 
Through the analysis of transactions, investigators try to match 
connections and interactions between addresses. Some tools 
have already started to index sets of transactions as a way to 
cluster them into specific groups [4][5].  
The positive sides to blockchain analysis are not hard to find. 
Detailed analytics can answer questions like how the 
cryptocurrency is being spent, where are the new wallets coming 
from and how can we trace the money [6]. Nevertheless, beside 
the economic indicators and market trends, blockchain analysis 
can involve further parameters like the embedded metadata and 
their connection with smart contracts, which transfer the 
landscape to a wider field of applications apart from normal 
cryptocurrency [7]. 
In this paper, blockchain analytic tools are examined in terms 
of their applications within the research and developers’ 
community, and their effectiveness in cybercrime investigation 
and analysis. Through study of related work, a thematic 
taxonomy is presented for the categorisation of blockchain 
analytic tools according to their applications. Specific tools are 
examined based on their features, efficiency and components, 
providing, this way, evaluation criteria for the selection of an 
appropriate solution in order to cover a set of investigation 
requirements. Furthermore, open challenges and practices are 
discussed as well as future areas of research and development.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section II provides 
background information on the technical aspects of blockchain 
and bitcoin. Section III presents a thematic taxonomy of the 
blockchain analytic tools and examines available tools and how 
they fit within the above-mentioned taxonomy scheme. Section 
IV explores open challenges in this field, while Section V draws 
conclusions and elaborates on recommendations for future work. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Information that is available in a blockchain is considered as 
extremely valuable for both data analysis and crime 
investigation. This section presents the backbone concept of 
blockchain and how it applies to bitcoin transactions. 
A. What is Blockchain 
Blockchain is a distributed technology built under peer-to-
peer network principles and cryptographic primitives, such as 
asymmetric encryption and digital signature. It allows trust-less 
users to exchange information and record transactions without 
external interference and coordination. Therefore, the 
blockchain infrastructure allows a secure and append-only 
database to be built that relies on a consensus protocol for 
deciding which of the valid information will be added in the 
distribution and propagated through the network of participants. 
As this technology can provide every member with a trusted and 
decentralised proof of work [8], the application part of it – like 
cryptocurrencies – can utilise what is usually referred to as 
public ledger. This means that all users have equal ledgers, 
ensuring, this way, transparency within the network. 
Different applications use the blockchain technology as a 
way to store value exchanges through transactions. Every 
transaction generated by a node is digitally signed with the 
previous transaction’s hash and the destination node’s public 
key; this scheme ensures that transactions are tamper-proof. 
Specific nodes in the blockchain network will validate a block 
containing transactions – which nodes depend on the type of 
consensus adopted by the network; this process is called mining 
[9, pp. 105-106]. For example, bitcoin adopts the proof-of-work 
consensus scheme where each node is presented with an 
intensive computational problem. Nodes which succeed in 
solving the problem will be able to incorporate the valid block 
into their version of the public ledger before it is broadcasted 
across the network. As it was shown in the original bitcoin 
induction [10], such a ledger will remain secure as long as more 
than the 50% of the computational power is controlled by honest 
users. 
Having the blockchain acting like a public ledger facilitates 
the ability for any blockchain analytic tool to query for 
transactions associated with a particular address, e.g., search for 
wallet addresses and check for related transactions. 
B. Overview of Bitcoin 
Bitcoin is a network protocol based on blockchain, 
introduced by Nakamoto [11] which allows payments and coin 
transfers to be made among participating entities. No trusted 
bank is needed to maintain balances, coordinate money 
transactions or issue new currency.  
The bitcoin network maintains a global distributed ledger of 
transactions which is public. In this case, each transaction 
represents a payment from one node to another. The payment 
address is generated after a set of irreversible cryptographic 
hashing functions of the sender’s public key; every new valid 
block is broadcasted to all network nodes. Bitcoin currently uses 
SHA-256 for those hashing operations [12].  
 
 
Fig. 1. Block construction of Bitcoin using Merkle Tree 
(TXn are application-specific transactions). 
The transactions listed in a new block have been verified by 
miners who also check that no coins are spent twice. 
Transactions of a new block are processed into a single hash 
value which is the root of a Merkle Tree [13]. Such binary tree 
structure only contains transactions in the leaves. The hashing 
scheme, illustrated in Fig. 1, propagates transactions’ hashes and 
combines them until a unique hash is obtained and added to a 
new block as the Merkle Root of transactions in the block. Also 
added to the new block is the hash of the previous block; both 
hashes and the replication of the ledger (among participants of 
the network) make the blockchain technology tamper-proof 
[14]. In case two miners broadcast a new block and one block is 
subset of the other, the block that has more transactions is kept 
[15]. 
Similar to cash change in physical transactions, bitcoin 
generates coin change, which is directed to a new (wallet) 
address rather than the original address. The main reason behind 
it is privacy. Maintaining privacy in blockchain depends on a 
strict separation between addresses and personal identities, a 
model referred to as pseudonymity [16]. For example, a bitcoin 
payment transfers coins from address #1 to #2 (from Bob to 
Alice), but directs change to address #3. Therefore, at first 
glance, it would be assumed that addresses #1 and #3 are 
associated with separate identities. The reality is, however, that 
addresses #1 and #3 might refer to the same identity, as 
illustrated in Fig. 2. These pseudonymous scheme makes the 
bitcoin graph very complex and ambiguous, therefore, extra 
information is needed to link wallet addresses to identities and 
perform different types of analysis – motivating the surge of 
blockchain analytic tools. 
 
Fig. 2. Bitcoin: payment & change scheme. 
III. BLOCKCHAIN ANALYTIC TOOLS 
This section presents a taxonomy model by examining tools 
and practices within the area of blockchain analytic tools in 
detail. The taxonomy model presented in Fig. 3 leads to 
discussion regarding open challenges in the area of blockchain 
analytics, elaborated in Section IV. 
A. Thematic Taxonomy of Blockchain Analytic Tools 
Investigations of cybercrime, in general, and of ransomware 
in particular, are increasingly relying on blockchain analytic 
tools since many attacks typically use cryptocurrency for 
harvesting ransom. For example, CryptoLocker campaigns have 
been under examination using blockchain information [17] [18]. 
Researchers have been able to identify embedded digital 
footprints that could reveal relevant information about identities 
behind them [19].  
As cryptocurrencies rely on cryptographic protection and a 
decentralised peer-to-peer system, money ownership is 
implicitly pseudonymous, while its flow is publicly available 
and visible. Blockchain analysis provides information about 
movements of cryptocurrencies. Several researchers have 
approached this topic with the help of blockchain analytic tools 
in order to de-anonymise users [20] [21]. Reid and Harrigan [21] 
outlined the difficulty of the combined anonymity and user 
behaviour while tools which emerged later, like Blockchain 
Inspector [22], use artificial intelligence in order to profile 
blockchain users and track their behaviours. However, using 
blockchain analytics has two main drawbacks, namely the big 
data volume [23] and dealing with users with multiple wallet 
addresses, as a result of the coin change scheme (Section II-B). 
Economic studies have been another area of interest which 
takes advantage of blockchain analysis. Moser and Bohme [24] 
focused on bitcoin transaction fees and tried to determine the 
agents’ behaviour via analysis of their transaction fees using the 
publicly available blockchain records on bitcoin and exchange 
rates from Coindesk [25]. Lischke and Fabian [26] and Ron and 
Shamir [27] conducted market analysis using blockchain, 
combining network data and geo-locations to get insights into 
the cryptocurrency business distribution over time. Both studies 
used blockexplorer.com [28] – an open source web tool that 
allows visualisation of information regarding blocks and 
blockchain transactions as their main source of data. 
Other areas of blockchain analysis include the study of the 
scripting language used by cryptocurrency protocols. Bartoletti 
and Pompianu [29] used blockchain analytics and developed a 
tool named OpReturnTool to investigate metadata related to the 
OP_RETURN instruction, a command that is included in bitcoin 
and provides a way to embed additional data into the blockchain 
[9, p. 193]. It is set to allow up to 80 bytes of data and, when a 
transaction that contains an OP_RETURN field is confirmed by 
mining, this content will be added into a block and will, 
therefore, remain within the blockchain forever. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Thematic taxonomy for applications of Blockchain 
Analytic Tools. 
In a nutshell, such tools have been used for a variety of 
purposes. Figure 3 captures those applications and provides a 
thematic taxonomy of blockchain analysis tools in terms of areas 
of interest. The next section studies in more detail further tools 
with the goal of mapping them against the proposed taxonomy. 
B. Additional Blockchain Analytic Tools 
This section reviews a selection of additional blockchain 
analytic tools, both open source and commercial tools, in order 
to identify relevant features. 
BitConeView [30] is a tool that can facilitate the 
examination of bitcoin flaws using visualisation of the 
blockchain. The tool also allows tracking of spending based on 
the stored transactions, enabling the identification of patterns of 
coin flow. BitIodine [4] is another tool to analyse blockchain; it 
parses information and provides a front-end which gives insights 
into a variety of information. Such information can be basic, like 
address account (i.e., wallet) balance and total number of 
transactions, up to more advanced information, like address 
clustering and address labelling using public information 
collected from the Internet. Both tools have been tested with 
success using different set of experimental work and scenarios, 
demonstrating to be an effective way to analyse and detect 
patterns within the blockchain and providing a way to improve 
security or privacy issues. 
Blockchain.info [31] is among the most popular and 
frequently used blockchain analytic tool, having firstly appeared 
on the market back in 2011. This tool provides some fast and 
easy-to-use capabilities for tracing individual transactions, while 
also provides plenty of information, including charts and 
statistics, about the whole bitcoin network. Ortega [22] used the 
publicly information from blockchain.info within a certain 
period in order to de-anonymise addresses from Tor services and 
proxies. Blockchain.info also delivers information in a 
convenient way and allows the analyst to tag each transaction 
with an associated name. Applying clustering heuristics to data 
provided by blockchain.info and information available on a 
public bitcoin forum [33], Meiklejohn et al. [34] were able to 
classify a number of transactions in a user network and perform 
a traffic analysis on money movement. 
Kinkeldey, Fekete and Isenberg [35] developed a system that 
can be used to recognise a bitcoin network entity based on its 
public address, regardless if that entity is an individual or an 
organisation. The tool is called BitConduite and utilises the 
network topology (with its billions of transactions) in order to 
provide an estimation of an address that could match an entity. 
Whereas bitcoin can be utilised in various ways – ranging from 
currency investment to illegal payments – BitConduite can 
become useful in order to explore and identify the rationality 
behind bitcoin usage. An analyst that works with BitConduite 
can perform grouping and filtering based on various attributes 
and visualise the results in a timeline. 
The trade data from cryptocurrency platforms can give 
interesting insights into money inflows and outflows. The 
website bitcoincharts.com [36] provides financial and technical 
information linked with bitcoin and has been utilised for analysis 
of daily trading rates, trends and anomalies [26]. 
BlockSci [37] is an open-source tool for blockchain analysis 
which mainly differentiates itself in two-ways. Firstly, it does 
not use a transactional database. Instead, it uses an analytical 
built-in memory that promises faster processing. Secondly, 
while most of the blockchain analytical tools focuses on bitcoin, 
BlockSci is more versatile and can support multiple blockchains 
apart from bitcoin, such as Litecoin and ZCash. 
Commercial software tools also exist in the market. 
Chainalysis [38] was proposed as an assessment tool allowing 
assessment of risks associated with bitcoin transactions. It is 
currently being used by law enforcement in cybercrime 
investigations involving bitcoin, as it is able to provide links 
between (a known) source and its recipients [39]. Similarly, 
Elliptic [40] offers software that can connect bitcoin activity to 
real world identity by utilising a proprietary database with 
millions of bitcoin addresses. Elliptic is often used by financial 
institutions and law enforcement as it offers transactions 
monitoring capabilities and transparent documentary evidence 
(including a proprietary database which links bitcoins addresses 
to web entities) [41]. 
C. Mapping Tools against the Proposed Thematic Taxonomy 
A common theme of the reviewed blockchain analytic tools 
is the provision of data to meet a range of analysis goals, 
delivered via different features. Most of the time, a full analysis 
requires combining data from the blockchain with external data 
obtained via blockchain analytics, wikis and/or discussion 
forums. Table I summarises all the tools covered against the 
taxonomy presented in Fig. 3. 
TABLE I.  ANALYSIS OF BLOCKCHAIN ANALYTIC TOOLS VS. THE 
PROPOSED THEMATIC TAXONOMY 
 
Thematic 
Taxonomy 
Features Tools 
Analysis of 
Relationships 
Transaction Graph Utilised 
for Address Clustering 
• BitIodine 
• Blockchain.info 
• BitConduite 
Wallet Explorer Proprietary 
Database 
• Chainalysis 
• Elliptic 
Analysis of 
Metadata OP_RETURN • OpReturnTool 
Analysis of 
Money Flows 
Transaction Graph Utilised 
for Address Clustering 
• BitConduite 
• BitConeView 
Address Tagging • Blockchain.info 
• Bitcointalk.org 
Analysis of 
User 
Behaviour 
Profile Rules • Blockchain Inspector 
Risk Assessment • Chainalysis 
Analysis of 
Transaction 
Fees 
Transaction Graph 
• Blockchain.info 
• Coindesk.com 
• BitConeView 
• BlockSci 
Exchange Rate 
• Blockchain.info 
• Coindesk.com 
• BlockSci 
Analysis of 
Market / 
Wallets 
Transaction Graph • Blockexplorer.com 
Trade Data • Bitcoincharts.com 
 
D. Discussion about Blockchain Analytic Tools  
Despite availability of several blockchain analytic tools as 
reviewed in Sections III-A and III-B, an analysis operation 
requires aggregation and correlation of different sources of 
information. Current tools provide very limited support for this 
and, therefore, analysts are usually required to implement 
additional tools to achieve their analysis goals. Additionally, to 
the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of generically-oriented 
analytic tools for blockchain. Even frameworks claiming to be 
“generic”, such as [42], mainly focus on bitcoin analysis, leaving 
other cryptocurrencies and purpose-built blockchains outside of 
their scope. 
The majority of the reviewed tools retrieves their underlying 
blockchain information with the use of BitcoinCore [43]. 
Thereafter, the data is encapsulated as Java object using Bitcoin 
J library APIs [44] before processing. However, neither Bitcoin 
Core nor Bitcoin J is a native tool to offer blockchain analysis. 
Therefore, a plethora of tools have been under development in 
order to extract blockchain information from, for example, the 
API from another existing analytic tool, or from the web page 
source code. Nevertheless, it seems that all these analytic tools 
have been consistently focusing on the same specifications and, 
as a result, their implementation has shown a significant amount 
of repetition while, at the same time, leaving behind the option 
of creating a blockchain parsing tool with more abstract 
objectives. 
To summarise, despite the considerable development work 
to explore and gain wide access to information encoded in a 
blockchain, the effort has focused too much on bitcoin and a 
small set of features. Possibly that work could be more effective 
and efficient through the use of generic-purpose, real-time 
analytics tools, that would provide the required level of 
abstraction in order to process a wider range of blockchain data. 
IV. OPEN CHALLENGES OF BLOCKCHAIN ANALYTICS 
This section discusses challenges of blockchain analytics 
that are relevant in performing different forms of investigation, 
such as cybercrime-oriented or (business) economics-oriented. 
Taking as starting point the summary discussion of Section III-
D, it further expands the discussion in different aspects. 
A. Big Data Analytics & Real Time Analysis 
Blockchain analytics could very well be combined with Big 
Data. In fact, blockchain could not only benefit data analytics, 
but also data management. Regarding data analytics, 
transactions encoded in blockchain could be used as a source for 
of information. For example, user trading patterns might be 
extracted with additional prediction of users’ potential trading 
behaviours within the analysis. As for data management, 
blockchain could be used to store important data as it is 
distributed and secure. Data provenance is also something that 
blockchain could ensure. For instance, if blockchain is used to 
store patients’ health information, the information could not be 
tampered, and it would be hard to steal that private information. 
Additionally, blockchain can provide better transparency in 
data analysis. The difference here is that blockchain will reject 
an input which is not verifiable and seems to be suspicious. As 
a consequence, a data analyst will only be dealing with 
information that is fully transparent. Simply put, a customers’ 
behaviour pattern identified within the blockchain will probably 
be more accurate compared to those currently being collected in 
typical databases. 
One of the challenges that financial institutions often face is 
the difficulty to detect fraud transactions, especially on a real 
time basis [45]. Considering that the blockchain records every 
transaction and that all remain within the ledger, it could 
possibly provide a way for real time pattern check. In fact, some 
of the blockchain analytic tools, such as Chainalysis [38], utilise 
this real time intelligence for decision making regarding 
anonymous information. From a privacy perspective, however, 
questions may arise since it mainly conflicts with the primary 
motivation for the popularity of cryptocurrencies – anonymity. 
B. The Inviolability Challenge & Hidden Suprises 
In the archival world, a record could be considered as a 
trusted one, and provide provisional evidence, when the storage 
process results from: (1) a consequent routing work of record 
keeping, with regulations regarding altering or tampering, and 
(2) the existence of valuable metadata to outline the context and 
relevant modification since its creation. However, a challenge 
exists to keep the records inviolable. In other words, how to 
protect a record from tampering or unauthorised access, deletion 
or alteration. Different practices have applied to achieve this 
over the years, from file content listing to user credentials for 
access control. However, sooner or later all methods would 
appear to have open threats for bypassing the rules. 
On the other hand, blockchain as a ledger and distributed 
database can maintain a constantly increasing set of data records 
that is protected from alteration. What has been noticed though, 
is that while blockchain in mostly associated with the 
publication of application-specific transactions – e.g., financial 
data for bitcoin applications – it can also be used to publish other 
sort of information as well [46]. As a publishing platform, 
blockchain is inherently resistant to censorship; once 
information is published, it is nearly impossible to remove it. 
Bitcoin users can take advantage of this feature by encoding data 
into bitcoin transactions, which are then permanently added to 
the blockchain [47]. Since its very inception, the bitcoin 
blockchain has had a tradition of political, artistic, or even 
religious expression. A few examples listed by Shirriff [48] 
include a speech published in the very first bitcoin block of data, 
presumably from Satoshi Nakamoto as a political statement 
regarding it as a response to the weaknesses of centralised 
financial institutions [49]. The bitcoin mining pool Eligius [50] 
has also published religious prayer in the blockchain, while the 
security researcher Dan Kaminsky added an ASCII memorial 
for cryptographer and privacy advocate Len Sassaman to the 
blockchain after his death [51].  
Possibly these examples can be read as an early stage of a 
future expansion of use of the blockchain. A way to work out the 
retrieval of those hidden messages and keep the blockchain 
independent of record keeping is a promising direction for data 
analysts to explore. 
C. Blockchain for Law Enforcement 
At the moment, law enforcement attention has mainly been 
focused on cryptocurrencies, as the other possibilities of 
application development (e.g., hidden data with criminal 
content; Section IV-B) do not seem to have reached the real 
world yet. The main question is how to identify criminal activity 
by overcoming the anonymity challenge. Indeed, the problem of 
attribution of identity is possibly the hardest challenge for those 
investigating cybercrimes and other types of crimes related with 
computer use and online activities. Decentralised payments, by 
definition, do not rely on any centralised point to facilitate law 
enforcement work. For example, a police investigation may 
result on the suspension of bank accounts, something that is not 
possible with decentralised payments. However, a company or 
institution that offers a service for decentralised payments could 
be under specific regulations, as a result of providing centralised 
access point. An example could be a currency exchange 
company that represents an intermediate layer between normal 
currency (cash) and cryptocurrencies (e.g., bitcoins). Such 
company could be enforced to comply with specific regulations, 
like anti-money laundering legislation. In fact, this is a key point 
regarding identity attribution. Besides the pseudonymity offered 
by cryptocurrencies, a physical identity is always involved in 
order to instantiate a wallet or for cashing crypto-coins out. 
 Blockchain analytic tools can offer law enforcement 
agencies considerable benefits. It provides the ability for tracing 
every transaction involved in a given cryptocurrency, including 
full address history starting from the very first transaction [52]. 
In that way, law enforcement could have all the needed records 
in order to trace transferred money, something that would not 
necessarily be feasible within the traditional economy. 
Notwithstanding the achieved anonymity that a cryptocurrency 
can offer, the address of a user’s wallet is still a number that will 
follow the user, so if that can be connected with a particular 
individual, then the transactions could be identifiable and 
traceable using that address. However, the challenge of 
identifying a user is becoming increasingly complex, as a new 
generation of privacy-oriented cryptocurrencies, like Monero or 
Zcash [53], is now being used for illegal payments. 
Data retention, achieved via blockchain, represents a benefit 
to law enforcement since it potentially allows a publicly 
available recording of transactions [54]. It is a continuous 
challenge for law enforcement the fact that phone and broadband 
providers apply diverse policies regarding customers’ and their 
related transactions data. In the world of cybercrime, it typically 
takes a significant amount of time to observe and track someone 
after an illegal activity, as this might involve record retrieval 
from different providers, or event data from a range of 
residencies and jurisdictions. It may happen that the investigator 
identifies specific records that will match a criminal activity with 
the suspect, just to realise that their relevance would no longer 
exist. Such situation would not hold within the blockchain 
infrastructure, as the records remain in place and unchanged due 
to blockchain’s append-only characteristic. 
A challenge that will probably become more and more 
relevant for law enforcement, however, is the use of different 
cryptocurrencies for a criminal activity as an intended way to 
add another layer of complexity for tracking. This means that 
transactions would be logged in different blockchains. In this 
case, a universal collection of data from different blockchains 
would need to be incorporated to today’s landscape of features 
provided by blockchain analytic tools. 
D. Anonymity vs. Pseudonymity 
It seems that the public in general misunderstands the 
concept of anonymity within virtual currencies. In other words, 
cryptocurrencies are mainly regarded as anonymous services. 
Nevertheless, considering the public and transparent nature of 
blockchain (such as bitcoin), it would be more accurate to 
describe such services as pseudonymous rather than anonymous. 
A deeper understanding on the difference in this context would 
benefit policy-making. 
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have introduced a new 
privacy perspective to financial transactions, compared to the 
traditional formats based on cash or cards. The key difference is 
that blockchain is public, although it makes use of 
pseudonymous identities. Something that creates the possibility 
of tracing and – theoretically - linking a transaction record with 
an identity [55]. The potential of linking a transaction with the 
public blockchain raises a challenge especially for the finance 
sector as it provides the potential of masking an identity behind 
transactions.  
An interesting perspective regarding linking an entity to a 
transaction arises from the banking regulations. In traditional 
banking, there is a specific set of privacy related regulations 
concerning the sharing of information between banking groups 
and individuals [56]. No similar regulations apply to 
cryptocurrencies yet. However, as they continue to evolve and 
adapt as an ordinary way of banking, there will be a time when 
crypto transactions will have to be registered [57], ending up 
with the same compliance requirements as traditional centralised 
institutions. 
Another challenge facing government regarding 
cryptocurrencies is the use of anonymity in order to perform 
money laundering [58]. Money laundering could be broadly 
described as a part of financial-related activities manipulated to 
hide the source of the money.  It is worth noticing that novel 
cryptocurrencies are focusing on true anonymity – rather than 
pseudonymity (such as bitcoin). For example, Zerocoin [59] 
adopts an anonymous structure, thus presenting a realistic 
money laundering threat. As a result, the recorded transactions 
could not be traced like they can for bitcoin, so an investigator 
will not be able to retrieve currency information regarding a 
wallet. If research and development of such novel anonymous 
cryptocurrencies keep evolving, that might trigger the 
development of regulations regarding bitcoin and other virtual 
currencies. 
E. Mixers and Money Laundry Services 
In order to preserve privacy, cryptocurrency users tend to use 
services called mixers. In a typical process, a mixing address 
receives coins from several different clients and forwards them 
in a random way to a fresh address for each client [60]. In other 
words, a cryptocurrency user is allowed to send coins from a 
certain address towards a mixing service and receive back from 
the service the same amount of money from a different address 
or addresses. In a nutshell, such services make the link with the 
original owner of the money even harder, acting as a “reset 
button” for wallets and bank accounts. Different approaches are 
adopted by different mixers.  
CoinJoin [61] is a mixing service example where two 
transactions are joined together to establish a single transaction 
while input and output will remain unchanged. The concept 
behind that service is to build a shared transaction, signed from 
all the participating nodes.  
Other mixing services are available like Coinmux [62], but 
it should be noted that if the service is built on a centralised 
model, then it might be possible to track and trace an exchange 
as the system will hold information from all inputs and outputs. 
A decentralised model is followed by CoinShuffle [63] which 
does not require a trusted third party. 
An extensive study on mixing services was published by 
Balthasar and Hernandez-Castro [64]. They interestingly 
identified cases – like the Bitlaunder or Coinmixer – where 
security can by compromised, reducing the privacy expectations 
of those services. However, there were other services, like 
Alphabay or Helix, which showed a considerable level of 
deficiency. It seems that providing a secure mixing service is a 
challenging task and that might be evaluated as a positive fact 
from a law enforcement perspective. On the other hand, there 
are also legitimate users that are using those services and, in that 
case, the risk of exposing their anonymity can be quite high. 
V. CONCLUSION & FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are adapting the 
blockchain protocol as peer-to-peer distributed electronic cash 
systems. Due to the way payment transactions operate over the 
Internet in a decentralised trust-less system, law enforcement 
agencies are seeking ways to aid their investigations, especially 
by tracking and monitoring money and data movements that are 
involved in cybercrime activities. The ability to use analytic 
tools on cryptocurrency transactions using blockchain tools is a 
promising way forward to fight cybercrime.  
The goal of this study was to explore the state-of-the art and 
practice of blockchain analytics. By exploring a variety of tools 
and techniques available, a thematic taxonomy was proposed 
and matched against the tools as a way to provide a better 
understanding of their purpose, and capabilities. It is interesting 
to observe how a single tool can be utilised for different 
application purposes, and what kind of information can be 
revealed using a combination of tools.  
The paper has also explored challenges related to blockchain 
analytics from different perspectives. One of them is the 
handling of high speed and huge volume of data which becomes 
increasingly demanding for blockchain analytic tools. Taking 
advantage of a predictive modelling as a result of big data 
capabilities, such tools can progress towards being more (pro) 
active instead of predictive. A merge between the topics of 
blockchain analytics and big data can layer into a reactive and 
predictive restructuring which is gradually undertaken in 
business intelligence science and allows automatic operations of 
wide areas of background tasks using smart contracts and 
financial data. In fact, the prognostic analysis from big data can 
promisingly fit together with the automated execution of smart 
contracts. 
It was uncovered in this study that blockchain transactions 
can possibly be used to conceal hidden messages which are 
persistent in the sense that they cannot be deleted or modified. 
Traditionally, such messages have been used, e.g., to avoid 
censorship or to make a public statement. However, Matzutt et 
al. [65] have recently published a study which revealed that 
illegal material, including links to sites hosting indecent images 
of children (IIOC) in the dark web, are being published and 
distributed via the bitcoin public ledger. This development 
confirms warnings by Interpol [66] in 2015 that harmful content 
(such as IIOC and malware) could be permanently posted using 
the blockchain technology. It raises a number of questions since 
the ledger is downloaded to be processed by miners and then 
broadcasted for the entire network representing an efficient 
distribution channel but also a risk for innocent people not 
knowledgeable of what is happening. Therefore, the 
implementation of software tools that will be able to efficiently 
and scalably identify and soundly extract those illegal material 
as evidence will be an important asset for cybercrime 
investigation and a powerful forensics tool. 
The development of intelligent real-time fraud transaction 
analytics, as a specialisation of blockchain analytic tools, could 
also be beneficial for financial institutions and law enforcement. 
Users of a blockchain-based systems would also benefit with the 
ability to inspect transactions in real-time with minimal cost. 
Besides that, an additional challenge will be to make a universal 
tool that is able to aggregate and correlate different sources of 
information and different custom-built blockchains.  
Blockchain represents a revolution with vast potential for 
applications to different domains. Law enforcement agencies 
can adopt two main streams to follow for the investigation of 
cybercrimes involving this technology. Firstly, a “follow the 
money” investigative approach [67], where supporting services 
such as mixers and currency exchange third-parties represent the 
centralised weak points. Secondly, as a repository and 
distribution platform for illegal and harmful material. In both 
situations, the attribution of identity remains a big challenge, 
although not impossible to overcome.   
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